Marx's historical materialist contributions towards political theory offered an alternative analysis of political dynamics centred around production forces rather than previous moral or ethical dimensions. Simultaneously, it instigated academic discussions on the optimal extent of moral and ethical considerations in political affairs, prompting investigations into whether Marx may have underestimated their significance. In this essay, I refute the question's premise, asserting Marx's arguments isn't characterised by underestimation but by inherent ambiguity. His analytical framework places morality and ethics in contrasting roles—explicitly neglected; yet implicitly utilised. The essay begins by reconstructing Marx's explicit argument against moral and ethical considerations, highlighting the materialistic foundations inherent in his analytical approach. Subsequently, the essay highlights implicit incorporations of moral nuances in Marx's arguments that subtly shape his discourse. This inquiry delves into dialectics to elucidate the paradoxical coexistence of moral and ethical considerations beyond mere oversight. Through a dual analysis, I emphasise the conflicting positions on morality and ethics within Marx's political analysis.
Explicit Distancing:
Evaluating the ambiguous role of moral and ethical considerations in Marx's political argument requires an understanding of his analytic method. Marx's approach involves a materialistic reinterpretation of Hegelian dialectics, where reality precedes ideals. Marx rejects Hegelian notions of society arising from the "consciousness of men". Instead, he asserts "social existence" shapes and dictates consciousness. Thus, "political forms" cannot be understood independently or through a "general development of…human mind". Rather, they emerge from "material conditions of life" (Marx et al., 1978, p4). Hegel views the state as the ultimate embodiment of social unity. Civil society exists within, and relies on, political structures. In contrast, Marx argues that political activities serve to meet evolving individual needs. Thus, political institutions are expressions of production forces and not expressions of morality and ethics.
Marx's analytical method is rooted in his conception of human nature that highlights humanity's unique production capabilities. Marx explains unlike bees that construct instinctively, architects can turn their imaginative ideas into tangible structures (Marx et al., 1978, p344). The capacity to transform raw materials into envisioned outcomes through labour defines the human essence. Foundational human characteristic thus begins with abilities to "produce means of subsistence" (Marx et al., 1978, p150). As productive activity symbolises human existence, any societal analysis should commence with production forces rather than morality or ethics.
Additionally, analytical foundation based on production aligns with historical scientific objectivity. Abilities to manifest mental constructs into reality isn't arbitrary but depends on historical conditions inherited from previous generations. As Marx notes in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, "men make their own history, but…not…as they please; they don't make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances…transmitted from the past" (Marx et al., 1978, p595). First, this underscores the role of historical conditions in shaping human productive capacities. Secondly, it highlights the constrained influence humans possess in determining both the scope and manner of their dominion over natural resources. Thus, production relations aren't only "inevitable" and "essencial" (Marx et al., 1978, p309), but also "independent of will" (Marx et al., 1978, p154). Utilising historical production forces devoid of human agency as the analytical foundation offers objectivity that morality and ethics lacks.
However, Marx doesn't outright reject morality and ethics; instead, he argues they shouldn't be viewed as external impositions on political assessment but as non-transhistorical components existing on the same intellectual plane as politics. Marx groups "morality" and "state", among other human consciousness-derived subjects, within the same classification, stating "religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art" are "particular modes of production" under the "general law of production" (Marx et al., 1978, p85). Moreover, In German Ideology, he emphasises that "material production…is…the basis of all history", assering intellectual constructs like morality, ethics, and politics derive from a productive foundation (Marx et al., 1978, p164). Marx further elaborates in Poverty of Philosophy that intellectual constructs are "historical and transitory", shifting with changes in production forces (Marx, 1847, p49).
In this framework, morality, ethics, and politics are classified as "superstructures"—or relations of production—shaped by prevailing forces of production. Instead of outright rejection, it is more fitting to recognise production relations as non-transhistorical elements, each unable to serve as an unilateral measure for another. Analysis therefore must consider specific historical and societal contexts. For instance, in a capitalist system, fairness of interest payments isn't determined by inherent moral principles but by compatibility with capitalist production relations (Marx, 1863-1883, p231). Similarly, different political orders aren't shaped by moral or ethical standards but by production forces, as illustrated by the transition from hand-mill society with feudal lords to steam-mill society with industrial capitalism (Marx, 1847, p49). Essentially, morality, ethics, and politics are all relations of production generated by human consciousness in response to particular forces of production in society.
Scholars suggest production relations can in turn change production forces. However, this interpretation lacks solid evidence and seems speculative. Only Wills (2012) presents one textual evidence in support—"theory becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses", (Marx et al., 1978, p60). However, the full quote actually reveals Marx's emphasis on radical theory that "grasp the root of the matter", referring to altering production forces. The example that subsequently followed explaining German theory's radicalism, abolishing religion, illustrates influences of ideas by fundamentally changing material realities of production forces. The passage concludes "material force must be overthrown by material force", underscoring the necessity of changing material conditions for societal transformation. Marx doesn't believe moral arguments can fundamentally alter societal structures rooted in production methods. Instead, Marx believed past revolutionary failures were attributable to an overreliance on idealistic faith in morality and ethics as catalysts for societal change (Marx et al., 1978, p165). Therefore, Marx's understanding of societal revolution is rooted in economic determinism, devoid of moral arguments.
When interpreting Marx's materialism, scholars may envision a society where production relations directly reflect production forces. Consequently, they argue moral, ethical, and political ideas could, in turn, influence production forces. However, Marx's political understanding diverges from this direct translation. Avineri (1968, p52) argues production relations are actually an alienated and "distorted" version of production forces, leading to dissonance between expected and actual outcomes in politics, morality, and social structures. Contradictions between state's ideal mission and real preconditions, alongside the objectification of social relations, generate individualistic moral values incongruent with true human nature based on social relationships. The illusion results in a paradoxical situation where "slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest freedom because it is in appearance the perfect independence of the individual". (Marx & Engels, 1845, p157). Consequently, Marx states, "everywhere presupposes that reason has been realised. But…everywhere comes into contradiction between its ideal mission and its real preconditions" (Marx et al., 1978, p14).
This dissonance challenges attempts to critique the state based solely on morality, ethics, or political ideals. Thus, Marx rejects socialist normative arguments such as "fair distribution", and "alienation of humanity", emphasising entwinement of alienated production relations impedes progress for change (Marx et al., 1978, p531; p494). Contrary to creating a political or moral/ethical theory, Marx aims to provide a theory of social reality divorced from distorted production relations' influence. True transformation, according to Marx, involves addressing underlying forces of production.
Implicit Utilisation:
Nonetheless, Marx subtly incorporated moral undertones in his writings, notably seen in his theory of exploitation. Initially, Marx sees no injustice in wage contracts, asserting capitalists rightfully own purchased labour with "no…injury to the seller" (Marx et al., 1978, p358). However, upon examining labour-power, Marx started viewing wage relations as inherently exploitative with a "semblance of exchange" (Marx et al., 1978, p273). Disparities occur between the worker's compensation and surplus-value generated: "worker…receives…the amount of objectified labour contained in his vital forces…[but] there is more labour objectified in his immediate existence than is contained in his mere vitality…" (Marx et al., 1978, p247-248). Workers receive wages equivalent to sustenance but produce surplus-value benefiting capitalists. Furthermore, despite the appearance of voluntary exchange, workers are "compelled" to sell their entire capacity for work ("the whole of his active life") due to lacking means of production (Marx et al., 1978, p376). The appearance of equal exchange, is in reality an unilateral appropriation of labour-power. The seemingly voluntary contract belies compulsion because workers—stripped from the ownership of the means of production—lack alternative options. Though not explicitly stated, Marx's critique inherently touches on concepts of distributive justice and illegitimacy, revealing a subtle engagement with ethical implications.
Additionally, there are indications that his implicit theory of moral and ethical values are transhistorical. First, Marx employs terminology associated with stealing to characterise the capitalist appropriation of surplus-value, including "robbery", "theft", "embezzled", and "booty". Since stealing entails the wrongful acquisition of another's rightful possessions, utilising these terms implies capitalist systems, "based on theft", are inherently unjust. These terms thus imply an inherent standard of justice going beyond mere adherence to capitalist norms and suggesting a transcendent standard of wrongdoing. Moreover, Marx's characterization of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, employing terms such as "conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder" (Marx et al., 1978, p. 432), underscores the existence of enduring moral and ethical standards spanning diverse historical epochs. This challenges the notion that moral values are exclusively confined to the norms of a particular mode of production.
Marx's overt rejection of moral and ethical discourse, alongside an underlying moral and ethical framework, may be attributed to his application of dialectical principles. In a traditional dialectical approach, Marx examines wage relations through opposing viewpoints: one portraying it as a market exchange of equivalents, while another revealing a lack of true equivalence due to surplus-labour. Dialectics wouldn't view these opposing perspectives as contradictory but as mutually consistent components of the same belief that labour is the origin of value, and generates something of greater value when labour-power is commodified and utilised.
However, Marx's dialectical inversion creates ambiguity rather than resolving justice debates. If dialectics imply a shift in the nature of wage relation from an exchange of equivalents to its opposite, then the initial explicit endorsement of equal exchange becomes problematic. There doesn't seem to be a clear indication of whether a normative assessment or distancing from it is more crucial. Consequently, Marx seems to simultaneously argue that the wage relationship is both not unjust (from a production mode perspective) and a form of theft (from an implicit moral standpoint). In navigating dialectical tensions present in Marx's discourse, a rigid categorisation of Marx's stance as either underestimating or fully embracing moral and ethical arguments oversimplifies the intricate interplay within his social theory.
Additionally, communism, a post-capitalist state "transcending justice" (Lukes, 1987), is paradoxically grounded in justice principles it seeks to overcome. Envisioning communism, Marx emphasises eliminating contradictions between overworked proletarians and idle capitalists: "if everybody has to work...the result of capital ceasing to exist" (Marx, 1863). Thus, the shift to communism, for Marx, is tied to achieving distributive justice. Elsewhere in Capital, Marx points to a 'higher' society without compulsion and monopolisation "by one portion of society at the expense of the other" (marx, 1863-1883, p593), echoing a positive distributive proposition implicit in Marx's communism.
In conclusion, Marx's political stance, often perceived as explicitly distancing itself from moral and ethical considerations, reveals a nuanced relationship upon closer examination. By dissecting Marx's materialist foundations, historical objectivity, classification of production relations, and alienated morality, this essay highlighted explicit condemnation of morality and ethics within his analytical method. Simultaneously, the exploration of his labour theory of value, capitalist expropriation, dialectics, and communism underscored implicit moral and ethical undertones. Rather than underestimating their significance, Marx's theory positions morality and ethics in two contrasting roles—overtly dismissed, yet subtly interwoven within the fabric of his arguments.
Bibliography:
Avineri, S. (1968). The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (1). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lukes, S. (1987). Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marx, K. (1847). The Poverty of Philosophy (Translated by Institute of Marxism-Leninism). Progress Publishers. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Poverty-Philosophy.pdf
Marx, K. (1863). Theories of Surplus Value, Chapter 21 (Translated by Burns, E., Simpson, R., & Cohen, J.). Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/ch21.htm
Marx, K. (1863-1883). Capital Volume III (Translated by Institute of Marxism-Leninism). International Publishers. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1845). The Holy Family (Translated by Dixon, R.). Foreign Languages Publishing House.
Marx, K., Engels, F., & Tucker, R. C. (1972). The Marx-Engels Reader. Norton.
Wills, V. (2012). Marx and Morality.